Dark web monitoring: find out before they use the keys
The alert is not «a credential turned up». It is «this person's credential, which opens this, is exposed — force the change now».
Most breaches start with a stolen password
The dark web is where stolen data is bought and sold: leaked databases, credential lists (combolists), corporate access. A good share of attacks does not begin with a technical feat but with a valid credential bought for a few euros and reused — because the person repeated a password, or because nobody knew it had leaked. It is initial access served on a plate.
The problem with a leaked credential is time: the longer it takes to detect, the wider the window the attacker has to try it. Continuous monitoring turns that leak into an actionable alert rather than a surprise six months later.
From the leak to the real person
Cloud Fortress watches for your organisation's data and credentials appearing in markets and forums, and when it finds something of yours it links it to the real person and asset in your inventory. The notice is not «a credential appeared»: it is «this person's credential, which opens this, is exposed — force the change now». Monitoring stops being information and becomes the first step of a response.
Cross-references with
Frequently asked questions
What do I do when one of my credentials shows up?
The alert arrives linked to the person and their access, so you can force the change and immediately review suspicious activity on that asset.
Does it only watch credentials?
Other leaked organisational data too. What matters is that it appears linked to your context, not as a loose list.
Are the passwords found shown?
No. Credentials appear masked. What you need in order to act is whose the account is, what it gives access to and how long it has been exposed — not the password, which we should not have in front of us either.
How does the platform know who a leak affects?
Because it cross-references the leaked data with your workforce and works out on its own which people, endpoints and groups are affected. Nobody has to go looking, and that cross-reference is what turns a notice into the first step of a response.
Can it be escalated to the SOC?
Yes, from the leak's own record, which also carries its conversation thread and its resolution status. The usual pattern is IT forcing the account reset while the analyst checks for suspicious activity on that asset.
See it running with your data in front of you
30 minutes with a scenario close to yours. No canned deck, no strings attached.